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MAYBE JUST A LITTLE BIT SPECIAL,
AFTER ALL?
LAWRENCE ZELENAK†
ABSTRACT
The attitude—common among tax professionals—that tax is
special (mostly because of its supposedly unique complexity), and that
special legal rules should apply in the tax context, has been described
and excoriated by scholars as “tax exceptionalism” or “tax myopia.”
The Supreme Court dealt tax exceptionalism a grievous blow in its
2011 opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States, in which it held that the Chevron standard
for determining the validity of regulations applied in tax just as it
applied in other fields. One commentator gleefully celebrated Mayo
as the death knell of tax exceptionalism, declaring, “The tax world
finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax law is not special.”
This Article offers, with numerous hedges and qualifications, a
defense of the exceptionalists and of exceptionalism. It makes three
points for the defense. First, it is not so much tax professionals who
think tax is special; rather, the view of tax as a thing apart is held most
strongly by everyone else. Second, to the extent tax professionals do
believe that tax is special, they resemble antitrust lawyers who think
that antitrust is special, bankruptcy lawyers who think that
bankruptcy is special, and so on. In other words, there is nothing
exceptional about tax exceptionalism. And, finally, to the extent tax
professionals not only think tax is special but also think it is more
special than, say, antitrust lawyers think that antitrust is special, they
may not be altogether wrong. Maybe tax really is just a little bit
special, after all.
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INTRODUCTION
In two provocative and oft-cited articles published more than a
decade apart, Professors Paul Caron and Kristin Hickman have
1
accused tax lawyers of wrongly believing that tax law is special. In his
1994 article, Caron identifies, criticizes, and labels as “tax myopia”
the “myth that tax law is fundamentally different from other areas of
2
law.” In Caron’s view, the myth has had unfortunate effects on both
tax law and the law more generally: “[T]his misperception has
impaired the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas
of law that should inform the tax debate. Similarly, other areas of law
have been impoverished by the failure to consider how tax law can
3
enrich their development.” Writing twelve years later, Hickman
describes and condemns the same phenomenon. Her “tax
exceptionalism” label for the phenomenon is less pejorative than
Caron’s “tax myopia,” and her focus—on the level of judicial
deference to be afforded to tax regulations—is narrower than Caron’s
comprehensive review of tax-is-special arguments and attitudes, but
her bottom line is the same as Caron’s:
[A] perception of tax exceptionalism . . . intrudes upon much
contemporary tax scholarship and jurisprudence. The view that tax
is different or special creates, among other problems, a cloistering
effect that too often leads practitioners, scholars, and courts
considering tax issues to misconstrue or disregard otherwise
interesting and relevant developments in non-tax areas, even when
4
the questions involved are not particularly unique to tax.

For those who persist in believing that tax is special, being
excoriated in the law reviews is bad enough. But having your position
rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court is much worse. For more
than a quarter century following the Supreme Court’s landmark 1984
opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

1. See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up
To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006).
2. Caron, supra note 1, at 518, 531.
3. Id. at 518.
4. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1541 (footnote omitted).
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5

Inc., it was unclear whether Chevron’s deferential standard for
judicial review of the validity of regulations—under which an agency
is free to choose, by regulation, any reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute—applied in the tax context. Adherents to the taxis-special school of thought argued that a tax-specific Supreme Court
opinion calling for a less deferential standard of review—National
6
7
Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States —had survived Chevron. Some
8
lower courts, including the U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court), agreed, and
for years the Supreme Court left the issue unresolved. Finally, in its
2011 opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research
9
v. United States, the Court firmly announced (as urged by Hickman in
10
11
both her tax exceptionalism article and in an amicus brief in Mayo )
that there was nothing special about tax in this context. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts declared, “[W]e are not inclined to
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law
only. . . . We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same
12
extent as our review of other regulations.”
In a Tax Notes article reviewing the major tax developments of
2011, Mayo provided both the headline and the lead. Under the
13
headline Year in Review: Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered,
contributing editor Jeremiah Coder highlighted the Mayo decision as
the most significant tax event of 2011. As an opponent of the tax
exceptionalists, he made no effort to conceal his glee:

5. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
7. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in
the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 59 (1995); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the
End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 749–50 (2002); Irving Salem et al.,
ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717,
740–41 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 131 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). For an excellent survey of
the confused state of the law on this question (as of 2006), see Hickman, supra note 1, at 1556–
59.
9. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
10. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1540–42.
11. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondent at 22,
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 3934618, at *22.
12. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
13. Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES
35 (2012).
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The tax world finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax
law is not special. It took an explicit Supreme Court statement for
the tax bar to become aware of its run-of-the-mill status, but that
statement has prompted soul-searching . . . . [B]y and large the field
assumed for decades that its unique set of issues required specialized
legal treatment when it came to litigation postures, judicial
deference, and administrative procedures. That notion was turned
on its head [by Mayo] . . . . What, a princess no longer, and in its
place nothing but a common maid? The Supreme Court is not afraid
14
to be blunt.

In the rhetorical war between the tax exceptionalists and their
opponents (call them the anti-exceptionalists), only the latter
conceived of the struggle in global terms. On the anti-exceptionalist
side, there are two articles (by Caron and Hickman, respectively)
identifying tax myopia or exceptionalism as a pervasive phenomenon
among tax specialists. These articles argue at considerable length that
tax is not special—not merely that it is not special with respect to
judicial deference to regulations, or any other particular issue, but
rather that it is not special in any respect. Also on the antiexceptionalist side, there is Coder triumphantly dancing on the grave
of tax exceptionalism. Although there are certainly law review articles
arguing, for example, that particular characteristics of the tax laws
justify the existence of tax-specific rules for determining the validity
15
of regulations, or require a tax-specific approach to statutory
16
interpretation, there is nary an article comparable in scope and
generality to the efforts of Caron and Hickman that takes the
opposing tax-is-special position across-the-board. Nor did any
proponent of tax-is-special take Mayo as an occasion to publish a
mournful eulogy for tax exceptionalism as a counterweight to Coder’s
gloating article.
The exceptionalist position is, if not exactly correct, at least more
defensible than might be suggested by the anti-exceptionalist critiques
and by the failure of the exceptionalists to offer any general defense
of tax exceptionalism. The purpose of this Article is to offer—with
numerous hedges and qualifications—a defense of the exceptionalists
and of exceptionalism. Part I reviews the charges against the
14. Id. at 35.
15. See supra note 7.
16. See, e.g., Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick,
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of
the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 806 (1989).
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exceptionalists, with a focus on the Caron and Hickman articles. Part
II makes three points for the defense. First, it is not so much tax
professionals who think tax is special; the view of tax as a thing apart
is held most strongly by everyone else. Second, to the extent tax
professionals do believe that tax is special, they resemble antitrust
lawyers who think that antitrust is special, bankruptcy lawyers who
think that bankruptcy is special, and so on. In other words, there is
nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism. And, finally, to the
extent tax professionals not only think tax is special but think it is
more special than, say, antitrust lawyers think that antitrust is special,
they may not be altogether wrong. Maybe tax really is just a little bit
special, after all.
I. THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AGAINST THE TAX EXCEPTIONALISTS
To begin with a bit of brush clearing, the term “tax
exceptionalism” has several different meanings in the tax policy
literature. In a usage originated by Professor Kyle Logue, the term
refers to an unreasonable and impractical insistence on “[k]eep[ing]
the tax laws clean of tax preference provisions, henceforth and
17
forever.” In the international tax context, scholars occasionally refer
to American “tax exceptionalism”—the tendency of the United States
to adopt and maintain tax rules different from those prevailing in the
18
rest of the world. The concern here, however, is not with tax
exceptionalism in either of these senses. Rather, it is with tax
exceptionalism as the notion that tax law is somehow deeply different
from other law, with the result that many of the rules that apply transsubstantively across the rest of the legal landscape do not, or should
not, apply to tax.
In his attack on the “myth that tax law is fundamentally different
19
from other areas of law,” Caron describes and critiques the

17. Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1525 (2000). For other
examples of the same usage (following Logue), see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH
CONG., NO. JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 35 (2008); and
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE
L.J. 955, 968–69 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909
U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 502–
03 (2010); Bernard Schneider, The End of Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S.
Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1, 57 (2012).
19. Caron, supra note 1, at 531.
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operation of the “myth” in several areas, including approaches to
statutory interpretation, the application (or nonapplication) of
20
Chevron, and the analysis of choice-of-forum questions. In all of the
areas he considers, Caron’s basic thesis is the same—that tax
specialists must “start opening up the tax law to the light of nontax
21
insights.”
Much of Caron’s discussion of statutory interpretation focuses on
the role of legislative history in the interpretive process. After
describing at some length the competing views among tax specialists
22
on this issue, Caron complains that “[m]any of the tax
cognoscenti . . . have not listened as statutory construction has
evolved over the past ten years into one of the hottest areas of
23
academic and judicial inquiry.” As Caron documents, at least some
of those experts justified their failure to listen on the grounds that tax
is so different from other fields that those developments had little or
no relevance to tax. His smoking gun is a passage from an article by
three former high-level U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury)
officials:
Much of what has been said in the literature and the case law about
the uses of legislative history rests on conclusions about the nature
of the legislative process generally, or in particular cases, that do not
apply in the tax area today. Federal tax statutes and the legislative
process that produces them differ from other legislation in such
degree that the difference is tantamount to a difference in kind. The
unique nature of the Internal Revenue Code is widely
24
acknowledged . . . .

Caron also, however, approvingly notes some then-recent nonmyopic
tax scholarship, in which tax scholars either “enter [into] the general
statutory construction debate by using tax cases to illustrate their
particular broad theoretical perspective,” or “undertake tax-specific
work that generates insights into the process of statutory construction
25
generally.”
20. See generally id.
21. Id. at 589.
22. Id. at 532–38.
23. Id. at 539.
24. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806. This passage, with the exception of the last
sentence, is quoted in Caron, supra note 1, at 535.
25. Caron, supra note 1, at 541. As examples of the first type of scholarship, Caron cites
William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541
(1988), and Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445
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Writing a decade after the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion
revolutionized the allocation of interpretive authority between courts
and administrative agencies, Caron laments:
[T]he revolution has not reached the tax front. Although Chevron is
cited in an increasing torrent of cases and articles, it has gone
virtually unnoticed in the tax area. For example, the Tax Court has
cited Chevron in only one case . . . . Moreover, the leading tax
treatises do not discuss Chevron, and the few tax articles citing the
26
case generally do so only in passing.

Caron does not offer a detailed analysis of why tax professionals
are afflicted with tax myopia, though he offers several hints that at the
core of the mistaken tax-is-special attitude is the belief that tax law is
uniquely complex. For example, Caron quotes the view of the
previously mentioned former high-level Treasury officials that the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) is the “‘lengthiest, most complex,
27
most internally interrelated statute on the books today.’” Similarly,
he quotes the Tax Court’s observation that a particular I.R.C.
provision is “‘part of a complex set of statutory provisions marked by
28
a high degree of specificity.’” Caron also notes that in a survey of
Northwestern Law School professors and American Bar Foundation
research specialists, “tax practice received [the] highest ‘intellectual
29
challenge score’ of thirty legal specialties.”
For Caron, tax lawyers’ disregard of Chevron is just one example
of tax myopia. By contrast, the entire focus of Hickman’s 2006 article
is on the question of whether Chevron applies to tax regulations. She
is careful, however, to situate the Chevron question in the broader
context of pervasive and pernicious tax exceptionalism: “The ongoing
debate over judicial deference toward tax regulations offers an
30
especially frustrating example of this tax exceptionalism at work.”

(1993). Caron, supra note 1, at 541 nn.103–04. As examples of scholarship of the second type, he
cites Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986), and Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). Caron,
supra note 1, at 542 n.107, 543 n.114.
26. Caron, supra note 1, at 556–57 (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. at 535 (quoting Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806).
28. Id. at 537 (quoting The “Miss Elizabeth” D. Leckie Scholarship Fund v. Comm’r, 87
T.C. 251, 260 (1986)).
29. Id. at 524 n.20 (citing JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 103 (1982)).
30. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1541.
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Hickman presents a two-part challenge to the claim that the less
deferential approach of National Muffler Dealers, rather than the
more deferential approach of Chevron, does and should apply to
challenges to tax regulations. First, in a tour de force of doctrinal
analysis, she explains why “[t]he common understanding of a unique
tax deference tradition simply does not accord with the Court’s
31
jurisprudence or the pre-Chevron scholarship.” Second, and of
greater interest for present purposes, she considers and rejects four
normative arguments offered by proponents of the post-Chevron
32
survival of National Muffler Dealers. Strikingly, the four arguments
she identifies have little or nothing to do with the primary feature
supporting the exceptionalists’ belief that tax is special—complexity.
Hickman begins by considering the proposition that the supposed
tradition of a unique deference standard for tax regulations provides
a normative (rather than merely a doctrinal) basis for maintaining
33
that tradition. She then turns to the argument that the allegedly
unique severity of the penalties for disregarding tax regulations
makes the civil tax context comparable to criminal law enforcement
34
and that Chevron does not apply in the criminal context. Next, she
considers the claim that the Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) have an interest in revenue maximization, for which
there is no analogue in other agencies, and which leads to a systemic
35
antitaxpayer bias in tax regulations. Finally, she evaluates the
argument that a high degree of judicial deference to regulations is
appropriate when regulations are promulgated by agencies on the
basis of their special nonlegal technical expertise (for example, on
scientific or engineering matters), but that drafting tax regulations
requires no such expertise, leading to the conclusion that tax
36
regulations deserve less deference than nontax regulations.
Hickman’s refutations of these four arguments are all quite
persuasive, and I agree with her conclusion that Chevron should be
fully applicable in the tax arena (as the Mayo Court decided a few
years later). The interesting point for present purposes, however, is
how little the four Hickman-identified tax-exceptionalist arguments

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1589.
Id. at 1589–1600.
Id. at 1590–91.
Id. at 1592–96.
Id. at 1596–98.
Id. at 1598–1600.
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have to do with the tremendous—exceptionalists would say unique—
complexity of the tax laws underpinning the exceptionalists’ belief
that tax is special. Because of this complexity, the laws (according to
the late public finance economist David F. Bradford) “can be
understood (if at all) by only a tiny priesthood of lawyers and
37
accountants.” Of the four normative arguments for exceptionalism
that Hickman considers, two make no claim that tax is unique in any
deep sense. Other areas of the law also have their traditions, and even
if tax penalties happen to be unusually severe, that is an accidental,
rather than essential, feature of the income tax. The third argument—
the appeal to alleged agency antitaxpayer bias—does depend on the
uniqueness of the tax-collecting function of government, but the
uniqueness of that function is unrelated to the belief in the unique
38
complexity of the income tax at the core of tax exceptionalism. And
the fourth argument—that the administration of the tax laws requires
less nonlegal technical expertise than the administration of many
nontax statutes—if anything cuts against complexity-based notions of
tax exceptionalism. There is, in short, a disconnect between the
reason that accusations of tax exceptionalism are plausible—that is,
because it is easy to believe that tax experts think their field is
uniquely complex—and the bill of particulars presented against the
exceptionalists.

37. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266 (1986). Bradford’s
statement is quoted, not quite accurately, by Caron, supra note 1, at 526.
38. As the text suggests, I disagree with Professor Leslie Book’s view that the uniqueness
of the tax-collecting function is at the core of tax exceptionalism. According to Book,
[T]he current encroachment on tax exceptionalism specifically stems from the
changing role of the Internal Revenue Code itself. The modern Tax Code is
implicated in an alphabet soup of credits and provisions that address topics and
behavior far from revenue collection. Accordingly, the justification for [tax
exceptionalism] . . . becomes less compelling as the Code takes on other roles beyond
pure revenue collection.
Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing Participation,
12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 539–40 (2012) (footnote omitted).
I suggest a thought experiment for any tax-specialist reader who, deep in her heart of
hearts, is sympathetic to the notion that maybe the federal income tax is at least a little bit
special. Do you feel the same way about state retail sales taxes, or the federal payroll tax? If, as
I suspect, you do not, this suggests that your sense of the income tax as special is based on its
complexity, and not on its character as a forced exaction.
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II. A (LIMITED) DEFENSE OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
As promised, I offer here three points in defense of those tax
professionals accused of tax exceptionalism and tax myopia (both the
few accused by name and the unnamed multitudes).
A. It’s Mostly Nontax People Who Think Tax Is Special
The claims that the income tax is hopelessly and uniquely
complex do not, by and large, come from tax professionals (who,
given their career choice, must not find the complexity
overwhelming). The claims come, rather, from everyone else—from
the general public, and from lawyers who do not specialize in tax. On
the popular culture front, the complexity of the income tax has been a
recurring theme in tax-related situation comedy episodes from the
1940s to the present. For example, a 1949 radio episode of Ozzie and
Harriet opens with the announcer setting the scene as Ozzie wrestles
with his tax return: “Ozzie Nelson, American, is completely
enmeshed in what is rapidly becoming one of America’s most
exasperating traditions. It calls for a complete mastery of arithmetic,
trigonometry, surveying, semantics, foreign languages (including
doubletalk and jabberwocky), not to mention mind reading, and—
39
above all—the control of temper.” Four decades later, a 1990
episode of Roseanne sounds the same theme. Husband Dan
complains as he works on the return, “This stuff’s so complicated
40
nobody can understand it.” Roseanne offers to help, but after a
short review of the instructions she says, “OK, I give up. What
41
language is this?”
It is not just the average person who finds the income tax
monstrously difficult. Even the most brilliant minds have expressed
the same opinion. Judge Learned Hand, widely considered to be
among the greatest jurists in American history, lamented his struggles
to comprehend the federal income tax:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—
couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of—

39. The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet: Income Tax Problems (NBC radio broadcast
Mar. 13, 1949).
40. Roseanne: April Fool’s Day (ABC television broadcast Apr. 10, 1990).
41. Id.
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leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important,
but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract,
but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate
42
expenditure of time.

True, Hand offers the income tax as an example of out-of-control
statutory complexity, rather than as the only instance. However, his
choice of the income tax as the example seems far from random.
Outside the legal field, the man whose name is synonymous with
genius echoes Hand’s opinion. Albert Einstein is frequently quoted—
including on the IRS website—as having said, “The hardest thing in
43
the world to understand is the income tax.” Because the quotation
seems a little too good to be true, and is almost always cited without
44
45
adequate sourcing, its authenticity has been questioned. Strangely
enough, however, there is strong evidence that Einstein did indeed
say this or at least something very like it. The quotation first appeared
in print eight years after Einstein’s death, in a 1963 letter to the editor
of Time magazine from Leo Mattersdorf, Einstein’s longtime tax
advisor and return preparer:
One year while I was at his Princeton home preparing his return,
Mrs. Einstein . . . asked me to stay for lunch. During the course of
the meal, the professor turned to me and with his inimitable chuckle
said: “The hardest thing in the world to understand is income taxes.”
I replied: “There is one thing more difficult, and that is your theory
46
of relativity.” “Oh, no,” he replied, “that is easy.”

If arguably the world’s greatest genius thinks the income tax is “the
hardest thing in the world to understand,” who are tax professionals
to disagree?
42. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
43. Tax Quotes, IRS, www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
44. The IRS website’s “Tax Quotes” is frequently cited in support of the quotation, but the
website itself gives no source. See id.
45. For example, the authenticity of the quotation has been doubted by Snopes.com, a
website devoted to separating fact from urban legend, which describes the Einstein income tax
quotation as a “sentiment popularly attributed to Einstein which . . . began to appear only well
after his death.” Compound Interest, SNOPES.COM, www.snopes.com/quotes/einstein/interest.asp
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
46. Leo Mattersdorf, Letter to the Editor, TIME, Feb. 22, 1963, at 12. For a wonderful essay
on the evidence relating to the authenticity of the Einstein quotation, see The Hardest Thing in
the World To Understand Is Income Taxes, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Mar. 7, 2011), http://
quoteinvestigator.com/2011/03/07/einstein-income-taxes. In addition to the essay itself, the
comments of David S. Miller (Leo Mattersdorf’s grandson) in the comments section are well
worth reading. Id.
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The perception of the uniquely byzantine character of the
income tax laws also pervades law-school culture, as Caron
47
entertainingly details in Tax Myopia. He describes second- and
third-year law students selecting their courses as “follow[ing] the
conventional wisdom that there are only two types of law school
48
courses: tax and everything else.” He also notes the perennial
phenomenon of candidates for entry-level teaching positions
indicating on their form resumes that they are (heroically enough)
willing and able to teach each and every subject in the entire law
school curriculum, but for one predictable exception: “anything but
49
tax.” Caron’s observations on this topic are consistent with my own
experience of how tax is viewed by law students and law faculty.
The bottom line is that the strongest evidence of taxexceptionalist attitudes—in the sense of a belief in the unique
complexity of the federal income tax—comes not from the statements
and acts of tax professionals, but from the comments and behaviors of
everyone else.
Moving from general attitudes to the specific question of
whether there should be one approach for determining the validity of
all nontax regulations (Chevron) and another less deferential
approach applicable only to tax regulations (National Muffler
Dealers), again the finger of blame (if blame there be) for tax
exceptionalism does not point at tax professionals. Instead, the
responsibility for the precarious survival of National Muffler Dealers
for the twenty-seven year period separating Chevron and Mayo lies
with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who—despite their immense
50
wisdom—are decidedly not tax specialists. Although the Court
sometimes cited Chevron during that period in cases involving
51
challenges to tax regulations, the Court also cited and applied
52
National Muffler Dealers. Tax specialists can hardly be blamed for
47. Caron, supra note 1, at 519–24.
48. Id. at 520.
49. Id. at 521 n.9 (quotation marks omitted).
50. Caron recounts a number of amusing anecdotes concerning the lack of enthusiasm for
tax cases among the Justices. Id. at 525–26. For example, Justice Souter reportedly explained his
willingness to sing along with the Chief Justice at the Court’s annual Christmas party: “I have to.
Otherwise I get all the tax cases.” Id. at 525 (citing Paul M. Barrett, Independent Justice, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at A1).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985).
52. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–62 (1991) (citing and
applying Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)); see also
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (citing Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560–
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thinking that there might be a special deference analysis for tax
regulations, given the nonspecialist Court’s continued post-Chevron
approval of National Muffler Dealers.
As Hickman has insightfully noted, the Court’s lengthy delay in
settling the Chevron-or-National Muffler Dealers question can be
largely explained by the fact that until Mayo, neither parties nor amici
53
had brought the question to the Court’s attention. As Hickman also
points out, however, both taxpayers and the government had strategic
reasons for not focusing the Court’s attention on the difference
between the Chevron and National Muffler Dealers standards, and for
54
not pressing the Court to choose one or the other. Taxpayers’
lawyers continued to cite National Muffler Dealers not out of any
deep-seated belief in tax exceptionalism, but because their challenges
to the validity of regulations would fare better under that case than
55
under Chevron. They were able to assert the post-Chevron viability
of National Muffler Dealers without challenge because the Office of
the Solicitor General (Solicitor General) did not contest the point.
For at least part of the post-Chevron period, the government doubted
the Court’s commitment to Chevron and was therefore careful not to
56
provoke precedents that might explicitly limit Chevron’s scope.
In short, for decades the nonspecialist Supreme Court sustained
the viability of the claim that there was a tax exception to the
Chevron doctrine. Although tax-specialist litigators were indeed slow
to urge the Court to clarify the application or nonapplication of
Chevron to tax, their reticence can be fully explained by litigation
strategies. There is no need, therefore, to appeal to the prevalence of
tax-exceptionalist attitudes among tax professionals. As with tax
exceptionalism in general, so too with tax exceptionalism on the
Chevron question: there is more evidence of tax exceptionalism
outside the tax profession than within.

61, on the question of deference to regulations, thus implicitly following National Muffler
Dealers).
53. See Kristin E. Hickman, Response, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or
Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 108 (2010) (“Until the present term, no tax
case before the Supreme Court offered anything remotely approximating clear briefing of the
Chevron versus National Muffler issue with regard to general authority Treasury regulations.”).
54. See id. at 110–11.
55. Id. at 110.
56. Id. at 110–11 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN.
L. NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14).
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B. And Besides, Everybody Else Does the Same Thing
Although I argue that a belief in the uniqueness of tax is most
pervasive among the general public and lawyers in nontax fields, I do
not deny that numerous tax professionals also harbor taxexceptionalist attitudes—of which the previously cited invocation of
“[t]he unique nature of the Internal Revenue Code” by three
57
prominent tax attorneys is a classic example. Practitioner belief in
subject-matter exceptionalism is not, however, limited to tax
practitioners. Specialists in other legal fields have similar beliefs
about the specialness of their fields (although those beliefs are
sometimes based on characteristics of the fields other than
complexity). In one other field—bankruptcy—pejorative descriptions
of “bankruptcy exceptionalism” appear in the scholarly literature
with a frequency not far behind the scholarly references to tax
58
exceptionalism. But the phenomenon extends well beyond the areas
in which it has been given a name. Labor lawyers are guilty of laborlaw exceptionalism, environmental lawyers are guilty of
environmental exceptionalism, and so on. In other words, there is
nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism. In fact, to the extent
the anti-exceptionalists assume subject-matter exceptionalism is a
phenomenon peculiar to tax, they are—ironically—engaging in a bit
of tax exceptionalism of their own.
In the administrative-law context, the widespread nature of
subject-matter exceptionalism is described in detail in a recent article
by Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman on agency-specific
59
precedents. Despite the purportedly trans-substantive character of
the vast majority of administrative law, Levy and Glicksman
demonstrate the existence of agency-specific deviations from general
principles of administrative law in the case of five agencies. Yes, the
IRS is one of the five agencies. The first IRS deviation discussed by

57. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806.
58. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 236–37 (2012)
(discussing bankruptcy exceptionalism in the context of conflicts-of-interest rules applicable to
bankruptcy attorneys); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional
Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 611–12 (2008) (considering bankruptcy
exceptionalism in the constitutional law context); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The
Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 390–91 (2012)
(discussing bankruptcy exceptionalism with respect to the administration of the law by the
judiciary rather than by an agency).
59. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499 (2011).
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Levy and Glicksman is the tax distinction between interpretive and
legislative regulations for purposes of determining whether
regulations must be promulgated using notice-and-comment
procedures—a distinction which does not comport with general
60
administrative-law doctrine. The second deviation is the survival
(according to a number of courts) of National Muffler Dealers for
61
many years following the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision. The
more interesting point, however, is that the other four agencies with
agency-specific precedents examined by Levy and Glicksman—the
Federal Communications Commission, the Social Security
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
62
National Labor Relations Board —are all charged with the
administration of nontax statutes.
According to Levy and Glicksman, agency-specific precedents
are attributable to the silo effect, a well-recognized phenomenon in
63
the organizational management field. They explain, “The isolated
silo rising above the plains is an evocative metaphor for the
propensity of departments or divisions within a large organization to
become isolated, with a resulting failure to communicate and pursue
64
common goals.” Silo effects are generally explained in terms of three
types of costs: agency costs (in this context, an administrative agency
pursuing goals different from those of the government as a whole),
transaction costs (which make it difficult for agencies to cooperate
with one another in furtherance of larger governmental goals), and
65
information costs (of sharing information among agencies). Levy
and Glicksman suggest that these three types of costs explain the
66
tendency of agencies to function as silos.
That agencies may function as silos does not by itself explain the
creation and maintenance of agency-specific precedents by generalist
judges, but Levy and Glicksman plausibly suggest an explanation
based on information costs: “[W]e think the critical factor is the

60. Id. at 515–23.
61. Id. at 524–25. Levy and Glicksman wrote their article shortly before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mayo, although the article’s publication date was shortly after the issuance
of the Court’s decision.
62. Id. at 526–51.
63. See id. at 510 & n.75 (collecting sources on the silo effect).
64. Id. at 510. To less peaceable minds, the image evoked by the silo effect may be of a
missile silo, rather than a grain silo.
65. Id. at 512–14.
66. Id.
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judicial-review process itself, in which the courts rely heavily on the
attorneys representing the parties as providers of information
67
regarding precedents.” Those attorneys tend to be specialists (in tax
law, environmental law, or labor law, for instance), and “practitioner
specialization affects marginal information costs so as to
induce . . . silo effects because the marginal costs of finding and
analyzing agency-specific precedents are small, while the costs of
moving beyond the agency may be significantly greater and the
68
marginal benefits of doing so are typically relatively small.”
Silo effects—and thus subject-matter exceptionalism—are to be
expected in any specialized area of the law. When an area of the law
is both highly specialized and large (in the sense of generating an
impressive number of judicial precedents), as in the case of federal
tax law, subject-matter exceptionalism is likely to be especially
pervasive. The large quantity of reported cases makes it likely there
will be cases on point from within the field, thus making it
unnecessary—or at least not obviously necessary—to search for
precedents from other areas of the law. And the difficulty of keeping
up with even in-field legal developments leaves practitioners with
little time for a hunt—seemingly unnecessary in any event—for
relevant cases from outside the field.
As it happens, the everybody-does-it nature of subject-matter
exceptionalism is well-illustrated in the specific context that has
served as Exhibit A in the case against tax exceptionalism—standards
of judicial deference to regulations in the post-Chevron era. Writing
eight years after Chevron, Professor Thomas Merrill observes that the
Supreme Court itself had applied “the Chevron framework . . . in only
about half the cases that the Court perceive[d] as presenting a
69
deference question.” Merrill also notes that the Court was especially
disposed to ignore Chevron “in areas where there is a particularly rich
70
tradition of pre-Chevron precedent on deference.” Merrill mentions
five areas—Title VII, labor, tax, social security, and the

67. Id. at 557.
68. Id. at 561.
69. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970
(1992).
70. Id. at 983 n.56; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1107–08 (noting the Supreme Court’s tendency to ignore Chevron
in the contexts of labor law, immigration, treaty interpretation, sentencing, education, and
regulated industries, in addition to tax).
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environment—in which the Court “still tend[ed] to frame the
deference standard in the terms expressed in earlier decisions specific
71
to these areas, rather than in terms of Chevron.” It is not a
coincidence that four of the five legal areas mentioned by Merrill are
among the five areas used by Levy and Glicksman to illustrate the
phenomenon of agency-specific precedents (despite the fact that Levy
and Glicksman discuss the Chevron question only in the tax
72
context). The fields of labor, tax, social security, and the
environment all feature the high degree of specialization and the
substantial body of case law conducive to the development of subjectmatter exceptionalism.
Thus, a more specific observation can be added to the general
observation that lawyers (and judges) practice subject-matter
exceptionalism in every specialized area of the law, not just tax:
exceptionalism on the very issue that has been offered as the leading
example of tax exceptionalism—deference standards in the aftermath
of Chevron—turns out to be not exceptional.
C. What’s More, It’s Not Necessarily Wrong (Sort of)
If practiced with care and nuance, subject-matter
exceptionalism—in tax or elsewhere—may be perfectly appropriate.
Although it makes sense to place the burden of persuasion on those
claiming (in whatever context) that tax is meaningfully different, in
some cases they may be able to carry that burden. Whether the
question is the proper approach to statutory interpretation, the extent
of judicial deference to regulations, or any other issue, the same rules
should apply trans-substantively to the extent the circumstances
justifying the rule exist trans-substantively. But different rules may be
appropriate to the extent that the change in the legal context changes
73
the relevant circumstances. Hickman herself has made this point,
71. Id. (citing Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (tax); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (Title VII); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332 (1989) (the environment); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (social security);
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Title VII); NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc.,
469 U.S. 490 (1985) (labor)).
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1157–58 (2010) (“One of us [Hickman] has publicly
rejected arguments favoring tax exceptionalism. We assume for now that tax and other
regulatory regimes differ in degree rather than in kind, but accept as possible that further
development of our theory may establish the tax regime as meaningfully different in kind . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).

ZELENAK FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1914

4/21/2014 9:18 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1897

and the point is implicit in the Supreme Court’s statement in Mayo
that “in the absence of such justification [for a special rule for tax], we
are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review
74
good for tax law only.” Nevertheless, the point is easily missed in the
general condemnation of tax exceptionalism and tax myopia.
As an example, consider the argument advanced by some tax
exceptionalists that tax regulations should enjoy less deference than
other regulations because Treasury and the IRS have an antitaxpayer
bias that has no parallel outside the tax context. The idea is that the
question of the validity of nontax regulations often arises in litigation
between private parties, as to which the regulation-writing agency is a
disinterested third party, whereas the question of the validity of tax
regulations arises in tax litigation in which the agency is a party with a
75
direct financial interest.
Hickman is unpersuaded by this claim, largely because the
number of “strikingly protaxpayer” tax regulations on the books
undercuts the claim of a systemic antitaxpayer bias among tax
76
77
regulation writers. I share Hickman’s view. But what if the
exceptionalists’ empirical claims on this point happened to be more
persuasive? Suppose that Treasury and the IRS were uniquely
situated among agencies in having a direct financial interest in the
application of their regulations and in their status as litigants in cases
74. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011)
(emphasis added).
75. See Gans, supra note 7, at 758 (suggesting agency bias resulting from the agency’s status
as the taxpayer’s adversary in litigation); Salem et al., supra note 7, at 724–25 (suggesting agency
bias resulting from a revenue-maximizing agenda).
76. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1596.
77. In fact, the IRS not infrequently takes positions so protaxpayer they cannot be
reconciled with the Code. For a discussion, see generally Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the
Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012). For the most
part, however, rather than displaying an anti- or protaxpayer bias, the IRS appears to make an
honest attempt to adhere to the “Statement of Principles of Internal Revenue Tax
Administration” that formerly appeared at the beginning of each Internal Revenue Bulletin:
It is the responsibility of each person in the Service, charged with the duty of
interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory provision and not
to adopt a strained construction in the belief that he or she is “protecting the
revenue.” The revenue is properly protected only when we ascertain and apply the
true meaning of the statute.
See 1999-8 I.R.B. 2 (containing the last appearance of the “Statement of Principles”). In lieu of
the “Statement of Principles,” Internal Revenue Bulletins now announce that “[t]he IRS
Mission” is to “[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand
and meet their tax responsibilities,” and to “enforce the law with integrity and fairness for all.”
See, e.g., 2014-14 I.R.B. intro. The quoted language from the “Statement of Principles”
originated (albeit without “or she”) in Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689, which is still in force.
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involving the validity of those regulations. Suppose also that objective
observers concluded the result was a systemic antitaxpayer bias in tax
regulations. If all that were true, there would be merit to the claim
that courts should adopt a less deferential approach in their review of
tax regulations than in their review of nontax regulations.
In such hypothetical circumstances, tax exceptionalism would be
at least defensible, perhaps even compelling. Notice, however, that
even then the exceptionalism would be accidental or contingent, in
the sense that if the same circumstances—agency financial interest,
adversarial status, and a resulting bias in the writing of regulations—
78
could be shown to exist in some nontax context, then the less
deferential standard would apply just as much in that context as in the
tax context. Whether this would still be exceptionalism (tax-andsomething-else exceptionalism) is a question of labels, not of
substance. The larger the number of agencies as to which the
circumstances justifying less deference exist, the less it looks like
exceptionalism and the more it looks like the application of a general
rule that there are two deference standards—one for when the
circumstances exist, and the other for when they do not. But the
system could be described in precisely the same way even if tax
happened to be the only area in which the circumstances obtained.
Whether one describes that as exceptionalism or as the application of
general principles to a set that happens to have only one member, the
treatment would be justified. To be clear: the particulars of the
antitaxpayer bias argument for less deference are far from persuasive,
but the structure of that argument could legitimately be used (with
better particulars) to make the case for subject-matter
exceptionalism—but always with the caveat that the exceptional
treatment would be extended to any other area in which the same
special circumstances existed.
Essentially the same analysis applies to the question of whether
the process of interpreting the I.R.C. is radically different from the
interpretation of other statutes. It is at least arguable that a short and
simple statute expressed in vague and general terms calls for a
fundamentally different interpretive approach than a lengthy and

78. For example, similar circumstances could exist, at least to some extent, with respect to
the regulations of the Federal Acquisition Regulation System.

ZELENAK FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1916

4/21/2014 9:18 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1897

79

The Supreme Court’s 1968 opinion in
intricate statute.
80
Commissioner v. Gordon, a corporate tax case, suggests as much:
“The requirements of [I.R.C. § 355] are detailed and specific, and
81
must be applied with precision.” For the sake of the argument that
follows, let us suppose that simple and complex statutes call for
different interpretive approaches. If it happens that federal tax law is
characterized by long and intricate statutory provisions and antitrust
law, for instance, by short and vague provisions, then the differing
approaches to interpreting the statutes in the two fields may be
82
viewed as an instance of subject-matter exceptionalism.
There is, however, another and better way to think about this.
The same overarching interpretive rules—read simple statutes one
way and complex statutes another—apply trans-substantively. Even if
all tax statutes were complex and all antitrust statutes were simple,
the resulting different ways of reading each statute could be viewed as
the consistent application of the same overarching rules, rather than
as subject-matter exceptionalism. But there is no need to argue that
hypothetical case, because within the long and intricate I.R.C. lurk
many short and simple (and vague) passages. Those passages are
interpreted according to the rules for simple statutes; they are not
interpreted as if they were complex merely because they are tax
statutes and tax statutes are usually complex. A classic example is the
83
Supreme Court’s 1960 opinion in Commissioner v. Duberstein, in
which the Court was called upon to interpret the longstanding
exclusion from gross income of “the value of property acquired by
84
gift.” Guided by the simplicity and vagueness of the provision, rather
than by the fact that it was a tax provision, the Court wrote: “We are
of opinion that the governing principles are necessarily
general . . . and that the problem is one which, under the present
statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive

79. The two types of statutes might also call for different analyses under Chevron of the
range of permissible regulatory interpretations; the regulation-writing agency would be more
constrained by the lengthy and intricate statute than by the short and vague one.
80. Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
81. Id. at 91–92.
82. Whether one approach or the other is viewed as the exceptional case will depend on
the viewer’s understanding of the typical level of statutory complexity.
83. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
84. Id. at 279–80 (quotation marks omitted). The exclusion is now codified at
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012). In the years before Duberstein, the same language appeared at § 22(b)(3)
of the 1939 Code. I.R.C. § 22(b)(3) (Supp. V 1939).
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85

statement . . . .” As long as the choice of interpretive approach is
governed by the character of the specific provision to be interpreted,
rather than by the character of the provision as a tax or nontax
statute, I would argue that subject-matter exceptionalism is not being
practiced—not even if 90 percent of the tax provisions at issue in the
cases happen to be of the Gordon type rather than the Duberstein
type.
Many years ago, I published an article arguing that the
interpretation of the I.R.C. simultaneously was and was not special,
86
for the same reasons expressed (much more succinctly) above. The
key passage on the special-or-not question read:
Interpreting statutes is not a task unique to the practice of tax law.
The principles that apply to the interpretation of any statute apply
to the interpretation of the Code as well. But the unique complexity
of the Code makes it more than just another statute, and for that
reason the question of when nonliteral interpretations of the Code
are appropriate merits separate discussion from the appropriateness
87
of nonliteral interpretations of statutes in general.

Was the former self who wrote that passage a tax exceptionalist
suffering from tax myopia (although the terms were not yet in
circulation), or did he see tax as part of the legal mainstream? Other
scholars have disagreed on the answer to that question. Caron cites
and discusses the article approvingly, as an example of nonmyopic
“tax-specific work that generates insights into the process of statutory
88
construction generally.” Professor Michael Livingston is of a
different opinion in his 1996 article on the interpretation of tax
89
statutes. Except for the nonuse of the tax exceptionalism label (he
90
refers to “tax essentialism” instead), Livingston’s article is to tax-isspecial claims about statutory interpretation as Hickman’s article is to

85. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284.
86. Zelenak, supra note 25, at 630.
87. Id. at 630 (footnote omitted). If I were revising this passage today, I would replace
“unique” with “extreme” or “unusual,” in recognition of my limited knowledge of the
complexity of all other federal statutes.
88. Caron, supra note 1, at 541; see id. at 542–43 (quoting Zelenak, supra note 25, at 630,
and discussing the article).
89. Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996).
90. Livingston cites approvingly Caron’s critique of “[t]ax [m]yopia,” id. at 710, and in
passing suggests a term of his own—“tax essentialism,” id. at 711—but Livingston appears not
much interested in naming the phenomenon he critiques.
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tax-is-special claims in the Chevron context. In opposition to “[t]he
sense . . . that tax law is somehow special, that it has nuances and
91
pitfalls unfathomable to the outsider,” Livingston poses a rhetorical
question: “What right does any area of law have to set itself apart,
proclaiming that its norms and methods are different from everyone
92
else’s?” He cites and discusses my article as an example of this
unfortunate tax-is-special attitude, in a section of his article with the
93
heading “The (Allegedly) Special Case of Tax Law.”
I hope it is clear by now that I consider Caron’s and Livingston’s
characterizations of my position—as tax exceptionalist or not—to be
equally plausible, and that as long as the substance of the position is
understood I am indifferent to how it is labeled. But too great a focus
on labels can blur the substance. Although Livingston presents my
views as being in opposition to his own, I in fact concur with his
articulation of his own position: “If tax law is not unique, it may be at
the extreme end of a continuum . . . . In this view, all statutes would
utilize the same interpretive methods, but the balance between
methods would depend on where on the continuum the particular
94
statute was located.” I am not sure why my position is deemed tax
essentialism but his virtually identical position is not.
To summarize: in statutory interpretation, and probably in a
number of other legal contexts as well, tax is special, and it isn’t.
Undoubtedly other areas of the law are similarly both special and
ordinary, each in its own fashion. Does this view qualify as tax
exceptionalism (or essentialism, or myopia)? One can argue either
way, and as long as tax exceptionalism is not understood as a term of
opprobrium, I doubt anything turns on the decision.
CONCLUSION
To hear the anti-exceptionalists tell it, tax exceptionalism is
pervasive among tax professionals. It is strange, however, that even as
tax exceptionalism has been pummeled in the law reviews and dealt a
grievous blow by Mayo, no one has risen in defense of tax
exceptionalism as a general attitude. When a particular position is
identified as tax exceptionalist, the identification is always in service
of the condemnation of the position and never in its defense.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 683.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 683–87.
Id. at 687.
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And yet tax is special—at least in the sense that every legal
specialty is special, but also in the stronger sense of being more
special than the average specialty. Whether or not the I.R.C. “is the
95
lengthiest, most complex . . . statute on the books today,” it is
certainly one of the leading contenders for that honor. It is special,
however, not only for its complexity but also for its function of
financing the operations of the federal government, and for its direct
impact on the personal finances of the vast majority of the American
96
population. And the impact of the income tax goes far beyond
bottom-line tax liabilities, because so many aspects of one’s life are
relevant to the tax liability determination. This point was eloquently
articulated by former IRS Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen:
“[T]axation, in reality, is life. If you know the position a person takes
on taxes, you can tell their whole philosophy. The tax code, once you
get to know it, embodies all the essence of life: greed, politics, power,
97
goodness, charity.” One could not plausibly say the same of
admiralty, antitrust, secured transactions, or even federal courts.
Of course, it does not automatically follow from the special
aspects of tax that, in any particular context, different legal rules
should apply to tax than to the rest of the legal universe. As noted
earlier, I favor a fairly strong presumption against special rules for
tax, and I have no quarrel with the Court’s analysis in Mayo. But
acknowledging all that, tax is still special, and one cannot rule out the

95. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806.
96. As famously noted by Mitt Romney, in any given recent year only a little more than
half of American households have paid any federal income tax. Mother Jones Releases Complete
Video of Romney at Private Fund-Raiser, CAUCUS (Sept. 18, 2012, 2:47 P.M.), http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/mother-jones-releases-complete-video-of-romney-atprivate-fund-raiser. The income tax, however, also directly affects the finances of tax return
filers receiving refundable tax credits—including the filers of more than twenty-five million
returns claiming the refundable earned income tax credit in 2010. Justin Bryan, Individual
Income Tax Returns, 2010, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2012, at 5, 14 fig.H. Counting those with
both positive and negative tax liabilities, in any given year the income tax directly affects the
substantial majority of American households. In addition, the percentage of households with a
net positive income tax liability over a twenty-year time frame is much higher than the
percentage with a positive liability in any single year. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.
& Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59
STAN. L. REV. 23, 67–68 (2006).
97. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 289 (1987) (quoting
Sheldon Cohen). Novelist David Foster Wallace was sufficiently impressed with Cohen’s
observation to place it (very slightly altered) in the mouth of an admirable IRS official in his
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possibility that upon occasion the force of that specialness may be
enough to overcome the presumption against a special rule for tax.
Whether the result should be labeled tax exceptionalism is debatable,
because the same special rule should apply in any nontax area of the
law in which the circumstances justifying the special tax rule also
exist. In any event, if the position stated here makes me a tax
exceptionalist, I gladly accept the label.

